1 From f672277509705c4034bc92a141eefee4524d15aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 
   2 From: Tobias Ronge <tobiasr@axis.com>
 
   3 Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 10:12:27 +0100
 
   4 Subject: [PATCH] gstrtspconnection: Security loophole making heap overflow
 
   6 The former code allowed an attacker to create a heap overflow by
 
   7 sending a longer than allowed session id in a response and including a
 
   8 semicolon to change the maximum length. With this change, the parser
 
   9 will never go beyond 512 bytes.
 
  11 Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
 
  13  gst-libs/gst/rtsp/gstrtspconnection.c | 2 +-
 
  14  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
  16 diff --git a/gst-libs/gst/rtsp/gstrtspconnection.c b/gst-libs/gst/rtsp/gstrtspconnection.c
 
  17 index a6755bedd..c0429064a 100644
 
  18 --- a/gst-libs/gst/rtsp/gstrtspconnection.c
 
  19 +++ b/gst-libs/gst/rtsp/gstrtspconnection.c
 
  20 @@ -2461,7 +2461,7 @@ build_next (GstRTSPBuilder * builder, GstRTSPMessage * message,
 
  21            maxlen = sizeof (conn->session_id) - 1;
 
  22            /* the sessionid can have attributes marked with ;
 
  23             * Make sure we strip them */
 
  24 -          for (i = 0; session_id[i] != '\0'; i++) {
 
  25 +          for (i = 0; i < maxlen && session_id[i] != '\0'; i++) {
 
  26              if (session_id[i] == ';') {