+++ /dev/null
-From 3bef159779c8fd39a070ec5c8191e18ba2efa79d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Claudio Laurita <claudio.laurita@integrazionetotale.it>
-Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2014 18:21:58 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix jimtcl auto configuration to force static library
- only. jimtcl ignores a --disable-shared option if a previous --enable-shared
- option was given. This breaks openocd compilation if shared was the preferred
- option in buildroot project.
-
-Signed-off-by: Claudio Laurita <claudio.laurita@integrazionetotale.it>
-
---- a/jimtcl/auto.def
-+++ b/jimtcl/auto.def
-@@ -194,12 +194,8 @@
- msg-result "Enabling references"
- define JIM_REFERENCES
- }
--if {[opt-bool shared with-jim-shared]} {
-- msg-result "Building shared library"
--} else {
-- msg-result "Building static library"
-- define JIM_STATICLIB
--}
-+msg-result "Building static library"
-+define JIM_STATICLIB
- define LIBSOEXT [format [get-define SH_SOEXTVER] [format %.2f [expr {[get-define JIM_VERSION] / 100.0}]]]
- define JIM_INSTALL [opt-bool install-jim]
- define JIM_DOCS [opt-bool docs]
--- /dev/null
+From 11ea78c4d253bb90296e2dd8c3f7fbf59ba397b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
+Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2017 06:30:31 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] configure: enable build on uclinux
+
+Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
+---
+ configure.ac | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index c680bda7..1a7980a0 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE([sysfsgpio],
+ [build_sysfsgpio=$enableval], [build_sysfsgpio=no])
+
+ AS_CASE([$host_os],
+- [linux*], [],
++ [linux*|uclinux*], [],
+ [
+ AS_IF([test "x$build_sysfsgpio" = "xyes"], [
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([sysfsgpio is only available on linux])
+--
+2.11.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 3a223ca3ebc7ac24d7726a0cd58e5695bc813657 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Fritiofson <andreas.fritiofson@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2018 21:00:47 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2018-5704: Prevent some forms of Cross Protocol Scripting
+ attacks
+
+OpenOCD can be targeted by a Cross Protocol Scripting attack from
+a web browser running malicious code, such as the following PoC:
+
+var x = new XMLHttpRequest();
+x.open("POST", "http://127.0.0.1:4444", true);
+x.send("exec xcalc\r\n");
+
+This mitigation should provide some protection from browser-based
+attacks and is based on the corresponding fix in Redis:
+
+https://github.com/antirez/redis/blob/8075572207b5aebb1385c4f233f5302544439325/src/networking.c#L1758
+
+
+Upstream-status: Under review: http://openocd.zylin.com/#/c/4335/
+Change-Id: Ia96ebe19b74b5805dc228bf7364c7971a90a4581
+Signed-off-by: Andreas Fritiofson <andreas.fritiofson@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Josef Gajdusek <atx@atx.name>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
+---
+ src/server/startup.tcl | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/server/startup.tcl b/src/server/startup.tcl
+index 64ace407..dd1b31e4 100644
+--- a/src/server/startup.tcl
++++ b/src/server/startup.tcl
+@@ -8,3 +8,14 @@ proc ocd_gdb_restart {target_id} {
+ # one target
+ reset halt
+ }
++
++proc prevent_cps {} {
++ echo "Possible SECURITY ATTACK detected."
++ echo "It looks like somebody is sending POST or Host: commands to OpenOCD."
++ echo "This is likely due to an attacker attempting to use Cross Protocol Scripting"
++ echo "to compromise your OpenOCD instance. Connection aborted."
++ exit
++}
++
++proc POST {args} { prevent_cps }
++proc Host: {args} { prevent_cps }
+--
+2.11.0
+
+++ /dev/null
-From 11ea78c4d253bb90296e2dd8c3f7fbf59ba397b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
-Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2017 06:30:31 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] configure: enable build on uclinux
-
-Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
----
- configure.ac | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index c680bda7..1a7980a0 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE([sysfsgpio],
- [build_sysfsgpio=$enableval], [build_sysfsgpio=no])
-
- AS_CASE([$host_os],
-- [linux*], [],
-+ [linux*|uclinux*], [],
- [
- AS_IF([test "x$build_sysfsgpio" = "xyes"], [
- AC_MSG_ERROR([sysfsgpio is only available on linux])
---
-2.11.0
-
+++ /dev/null
-From 3a223ca3ebc7ac24d7726a0cd58e5695bc813657 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andreas Fritiofson <andreas.fritiofson@gmail.com>
-Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2018 21:00:47 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2018-5704: Prevent some forms of Cross Protocol Scripting
- attacks
-
-OpenOCD can be targeted by a Cross Protocol Scripting attack from
-a web browser running malicious code, such as the following PoC:
-
-var x = new XMLHttpRequest();
-x.open("POST", "http://127.0.0.1:4444", true);
-x.send("exec xcalc\r\n");
-
-This mitigation should provide some protection from browser-based
-attacks and is based on the corresponding fix in Redis:
-
-https://github.com/antirez/redis/blob/8075572207b5aebb1385c4f233f5302544439325/src/networking.c#L1758
-
-
-Upstream-status: Under review: http://openocd.zylin.com/#/c/4335/
-Change-Id: Ia96ebe19b74b5805dc228bf7364c7971a90a4581
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Fritiofson <andreas.fritiofson@gmail.com>
-Reported-by: Josef Gajdusek <atx@atx.name>
-Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
----
- src/server/startup.tcl | 11 +++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/server/startup.tcl b/src/server/startup.tcl
-index 64ace407..dd1b31e4 100644
---- a/src/server/startup.tcl
-+++ b/src/server/startup.tcl
-@@ -8,3 +8,14 @@ proc ocd_gdb_restart {target_id} {
- # one target
- reset halt
- }
-+
-+proc prevent_cps {} {
-+ echo "Possible SECURITY ATTACK detected."
-+ echo "It looks like somebody is sending POST or Host: commands to OpenOCD."
-+ echo "This is likely due to an attacker attempting to use Cross Protocol Scripting"
-+ echo "to compromise your OpenOCD instance. Connection aborted."
-+ exit
-+}
-+
-+proc POST {args} { prevent_cps }
-+proc Host: {args} { prevent_cps }
---
-2.11.0
-
config BR2_PACKAGE_OPENOCD
bool "openocd"
+ select BR2_PACKAGE_JIMTCL
help
OpenOCD - Open On-Chip Debugger
OPENOCD_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING
# 0002-configure-enable-build-on-uclinux.patch patches configure.ac
OPENOCD_AUTORECONF = YES
-
-# The bundled jimtcl really wants to find a existing $CXX, so feed it
-# false when we do not have one.
-OPENOCD_CONF_ENV = \
- $(if $(BR2_INSTALL_LIBSTDCPP),,CXX=false) \
- CFLAGS="$(TARGET_CFLAGS) -std=gnu99"
+OPENOCD_CONF_ENV = CFLAGS="$(TARGET_CFLAGS) -std=gnu99"
OPENOCD_CONF_OPTS = \
--oldincludedir=$(STAGING_DIR)/usr/include \
--includedir=$(STAGING_DIR)/usr/include \
--disable-doxygen-html \
- --with-jim-shared=no \
+ --disable-internal-jimtcl \
--disable-shared \
--enable-dummy \
--disable-werror
OPENOCD_DEPENDENCIES = \
host-pkgconf \
+ jimtcl \
$(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBFTDI1),libftdi1) \
$(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBUSB),libusb) \
$(if $(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBUSB_COMPAT),libusb-compat) \
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