package/wpa_supplicant: add upstream patch to fix CVE-2021-30004

Fixes the following security issue for the internal TLS backend:

- CVE-2021-30004: In wpa_supplicant and hostapd 2.9, forging attacks may
  occur because AlgorithmIdentifier parameters are mishandled in tls/pkcs1.c
  and tls/x509v3.c.

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>

diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-ASN.1-Validate-DigestAlgorithmIdentifier-parameters.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-ASN.1-Validate-DigestAlgorithmIdentifier-parameters.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..5dcfed9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-ASN.1-Validate-DigestAlgorithmIdentifier-parameters.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+From a0541334a6394f8237a4393b7372693cd7e96f15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 18:19:31 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ASN.1: Validate DigestAlgorithmIdentifier parameters
+
+The supported hash algorithms do not use AlgorithmIdentifier parameters.
+However, there are implementations that include NULL parameters in
+addition to ones that omit the parameters. Previous implementation did
+not check the parameters value at all which supported both these cases,
+but did not reject any other unexpected information.
+
+Use strict validation of digest algorithm parameters and reject any
+unexpected value when validating a signature. This is needed to prevent
+potential forging attacks.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
+---
+ src/tls/pkcs1.c  | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/tls/x509v3.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/tls/pkcs1.c b/src/tls/pkcs1.c
+index bbdb0d72d..5761dfed0 100644
+--- a/src/tls/pkcs1.c
++++ b/src/tls/pkcs1.c
+@@ -244,6 +244,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk,
+               os_free(decrypted);
+               return -1;
+       }
++      wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestInfo",
++                  hdr.payload, hdr.length);
+ 
+       pos = hdr.payload;
+       end = pos + hdr.length;
+@@ -265,6 +267,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk,
+               os_free(decrypted);
+               return -1;
+       }
++      wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier",
++                  hdr.payload, hdr.length);
+       da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length;
+ 
+       if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) {
+@@ -273,6 +277,23 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk,
+               os_free(decrypted);
+               return -1;
+       }
++      wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: Digest algorithm parameters",
++                  next, da_end - next);
++
++      /*
++       * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to
++       * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these
++       * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else.
++       */
++      if (da_end > next &&
++          (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 ||
++           !asn1_is_null(&hdr) ||
++           hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) {
++              wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++                         "PKCS #1: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters");
++              os_free(decrypted);
++              return -1;
++      }
+ 
+       if (!asn1_oid_equal(&oid, hash_alg)) {
+               char txt[100], txt2[100];
+diff --git a/src/tls/x509v3.c b/src/tls/x509v3.c
+index a8944dd2f..df337ec4d 100644
+--- a/src/tls/x509v3.c
++++ b/src/tls/x509v3.c
+@@ -1964,6 +1964,7 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer,
+               os_free(data);
+               return -1;
+       }
++      wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestInfo", hdr.payload, hdr.length);
+ 
+       pos = hdr.payload;
+       end = pos + hdr.length;
+@@ -1985,6 +1986,8 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer,
+               os_free(data);
+               return -1;
+       }
++      wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier",
++                  hdr.payload, hdr.length);
+       da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length;
+ 
+       if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) {
+@@ -1992,6 +1995,23 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer,
+               os_free(data);
+               return -1;
+       }
++      wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: Digest algorithm parameters",
++                  next, da_end - next);
++
++      /*
++       * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to
++       * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these
++       * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else.
++       */
++      if (da_end > next &&
++          (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 ||
++           !asn1_is_null(&hdr) ||
++           hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) {
++              wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++                         "X509: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters");
++              os_free(data);
++              return -1;
++      }
+ 
+       if (x509_sha1_oid(&oid)) {
+               if (signature->oid.oid[6] != 5 /* sha-1WithRSAEncryption */) {
+-- 
+2.20.1
+

diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk
index f59832645fce71879211b544d0f574f11e88c7fa..e9078b9f8984e014b245556c7894471877d4510e 100644 (file)
--- a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk
+++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ WPA_SUPPLICANT_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-16275
 # 0001-P2P-Fix-a-corner-case-in-peer-addition-based-on-PD-R.patch
 WPA_SUPPLICANT_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2021-27803
 
+# 0002-ASN.1-Validate-DigestAlgorithmIdentifier-parameters.patch
+WPA_SUPPLICANT_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2021-30004
+
 # install the wpa_client library
 WPA_SUPPLICANT_INSTALL_STAGING = YES
 
@@ -132,8 +135,6 @@ ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBOPENSSL),y)
 WPA_SUPPLICANT_DEPENDENCIES += host-pkgconf libopenssl
 WPA_SUPPLICANT_LIBS += `$(PKG_CONFIG_HOST_BINARY) --libs openssl`
 WPA_SUPPLICANT_CONFIG_EDITS += 's/\#\(CONFIG_TLS=openssl\)/\1/'
-# Issue only affects the "internal" TLS implementation
-WPA_SUPPLICANT_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2021-30004
 else
 WPA_SUPPLICANT_CONFIG_DISABLE += CONFIG_EAP_PWD CONFIG_EAP_TEAP
 WPA_SUPPLICANT_CONFIG_EDITS += 's/\#\(CONFIG_TLS=\).*/\1internal/'