dnsmasq: add upstream security fix patches
authorBaruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Thu, 8 Feb 2018 19:16:35 +0000 (21:16 +0200)
committerThomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Thu, 8 Feb 2018 22:04:47 +0000 (23:04 +0100)
Fixes CVE-2017-15107: An attacker can craft an NSEC which wrongly proves
non-existence.

Cc: Matt Weber <matthew.weber@rockwellcollins.com>
Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
package/dnsmasq/0001-DNSSEC-fix-for-wildcard-NSEC-records.-CVE-2017-15107.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
package/dnsmasq/0002-Fix-DNSSEC-validation-errors-introduced-in-4fe6744a2.patch [new file with mode: 0644]

diff --git a/package/dnsmasq/0001-DNSSEC-fix-for-wildcard-NSEC-records.-CVE-2017-15107.patch b/package/dnsmasq/0001-DNSSEC-fix-for-wildcard-NSEC-records.-CVE-2017-15107.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..7b834e8
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+From 4fe6744a220eddd3f1749b40cac3dfc510787de6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2018 12:26:08 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] DNSSEC fix for wildcard NSEC records. CVE-2017-15107 applies.
+
+It's OK for NSEC records to be expanded from wildcards,
+but in that case, the proof of non-existence is only valid
+starting at the wildcard name, *.<domain> NOT the name expanded
+from the wildcard. Without this check it's possible for an
+attacker to craft an NSEC which wrongly proves non-existence
+in a domain which includes a wildcard for NSEC.
+
+[baruch: drop the CHANGELOG hunk]
+Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
+---
+Upstream status: upstream commit 4fe6744a220e
+
+ CHANGELOG    |  12 +++++-
+ src/dnssec.c | 117 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 2 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
+index eb6c11cbe00f..a54a0b4f14cf 100644
+--- a/src/dnssec.c
++++ b/src/dnssec.c
+@@ -103,15 +103,17 @@ static void from_wire(char *name)
+ static int count_labels(char *name)
+ {
+   int i;
+-
++  char *p;
++  
+   if (*name == 0)
+     return 0;
+-  for (i = 0; *name; name++)
+-    if (*name == '.')
++  for (p = name, i = 0; *p; p++)
++    if (*p == '.')
+       i++;
+-  return i+1;
++  /* Don't count empty first label. */
++  return *name == '.' ? i : i+1;
+ }
+ /* Implement RFC1982 wrapped compare for 32-bit numbers */
+@@ -1094,8 +1096,8 @@ static int hostname_cmp(const char *a, const char *b)
+     }
+ }
+-static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **nsecs, int nsec_count,
+-                                  char *workspace1, char *workspace2, char *name, int type, int *nons)
++static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **nsecs, unsigned char **labels, int nsec_count,
++                                  char *workspace1_in, char *workspace2, char *name, int type, int *nons)
+ {
+   int i, rc, rdlen;
+   unsigned char *p, *psave;
+@@ -1108,6 +1110,9 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
+   /* Find NSEC record that proves name doesn't exist */
+   for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
+     {
++      char *workspace1 = workspace1_in;
++      int sig_labels, name_labels;
++
+       p = nsecs[i];
+       if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 10))
+       return 0;
+@@ -1116,7 +1121,27 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
+       psave = p;
+       if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, 1, 10))
+       return 0;
+-      
++
++      /* If NSEC comes from wildcard expansion, use original wildcard
++       as name for computation. */
++      sig_labels = *labels[i];
++      name_labels = count_labels(workspace1);
++
++      if (sig_labels < name_labels)
++      {
++        int k;
++        for (k = name_labels - sig_labels; k != 0; k--)
++          {
++            while (*workspace1 != '.' && *workspace1 != 0)
++              workspace1++;
++            if (k != 1 && *workspace1 == '.')
++              workspace1++;
++          }
++        
++        workspace1--;
++        *workspace1 = '*';
++      }
++        
+       rc = hostname_cmp(workspace1, name);
+       
+       if (rc == 0)
+@@ -1514,24 +1539,26 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
+ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *keyname, char *name, int qtype, int qclass, char *wildname, int *nons)
+ {
+-  static unsigned char **nsecset = NULL;
+-  static int nsecset_sz = 0;
++  static unsigned char **nsecset = NULL, **rrsig_labels = NULL;
++  static int nsecset_sz = 0, rrsig_labels_sz = 0;
+   
+   int type_found = 0;
+-  unsigned char *p = skip_questions(header, plen);
++  unsigned char *auth_start, *p = skip_questions(header, plen);
+   int type, class, rdlen, i, nsecs_found;
+   
+   /* Move to NS section */
+   if (!p || !(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header, plen)))
+     return 0;
++
++  auth_start = p;
+   
+   for (nsecs_found = 0, i = ntohs(header->nscount); i != 0; i--)
+     {
+       unsigned char *pstart = p;
+       
+-      if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
++      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 10))
+       return 0;
+-      
++        
+       GETSHORT(type, p); 
+       GETSHORT(class, p);
+       p += 4; /* TTL */
+@@ -1548,7 +1575,69 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
+         if (!expand_workspace(&nsecset, &nsecset_sz, nsecs_found))
+           return 0; 
+         
+-        nsecset[nsecs_found++] = pstart;
++        if (type == T_NSEC)
++          {
++            /* If we're looking for NSECs, find the corresponding SIGs, to 
++               extract the labels value, which we need in case the NSECs
++               are the result of wildcard expansion.
++               Note that the NSEC may not have been validated yet
++               so if there are multiple SIGs, make sure the label value
++               is the same in all, to avoid be duped by a rogue one.
++               If there are no SIGs, that's an error */
++            unsigned char *p1 = auth_start;
++            int res, j, rdlen1, type1, class1;
++            
++            if (!expand_workspace(&rrsig_labels, &rrsig_labels_sz, nsecs_found))
++              return 0;
++            
++            rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] = NULL;
++            
++            for (j = ntohs(header->nscount); j != 0; j--)
++              {
++                if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p1, daemon->workspacename, 0, 10)))
++                  return 0;
++
++                 GETSHORT(type1, p1); 
++                 GETSHORT(class1, p1);
++                 p1 += 4; /* TTL */
++                 GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1);
++
++                 if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
++                   return 0;
++                 
++                 if (res == 1 && class1 == qclass && type1 == T_RRSIG)
++                   {
++                     int type_covered;
++                     unsigned char *psav = p1;
++                     
++                     if (rdlen < 18)
++                       return 0; /* bad packet */
++
++                     GETSHORT(type_covered, p1);
++
++                     if (type_covered == T_NSEC)
++                       {
++                         p1++; /* algo */
++                         
++                         /* labels field must be the same in every SIG we find. */
++                         if (!rrsig_labels[nsecs_found])
++                           rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] = p1;
++                         else if (*rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] != *p1) /* algo */
++                           return 0;
++                         }
++                     p1 = psav;
++                   }
++                 
++                 if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
++                   return 0;
++              }
++
++            /* Must have found at least one sig. */
++            if (!rrsig_labels[nsecs_found])
++              return 0;
++          }
++
++        nsecset[nsecs_found++] = pstart;   
+       }
+       
+       if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
+@@ -1556,7 +1645,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
+     }
+   
+   if (type_found == T_NSEC)
+-    return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
++    return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset, rrsig_labels, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
+   else if (type_found == T_NSEC3)
+     return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecset, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, wildname, nons);
+   else
+-- 
+2.15.1
+
diff --git a/package/dnsmasq/0002-Fix-DNSSEC-validation-errors-introduced-in-4fe6744a2.patch b/package/dnsmasq/0002-Fix-DNSSEC-validation-errors-introduced-in-4fe6744a2.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..ef28b90
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From cd7df612b14ec1bf831a966ccaf076be0dae7404 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Sat, 20 Jan 2018 00:10:55 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DNSSEC validation errors introduced in
+ 4fe6744a220eddd3f1749b40cac3dfc510787de6
+
+Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
+---
+Upstream status: upstream commit cd7df612b14ec
+
+ src/dnssec.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
+index a54a0b4f14cf..c47e33569f96 100644
+--- a/src/dnssec.c
++++ b/src/dnssec.c
+@@ -1610,7 +1610,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
+                      int type_covered;
+                      unsigned char *psav = p1;
+                      
+-                     if (rdlen < 18)
++                     if (rdlen1 < 18)
+                        return 0; /* bad packet */
+                      GETSHORT(type_covered, p1);
+-- 
+2.15.1
+