hostapd: add security patches

Fixes:
CVE-2015-5314 - hostapd: EAP-pwd missing last fragment length validation

Signed-off-by: Gustavo Zacarias <gustavo@zacarias.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>

diff --git a/package/hostapd/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch b/package/hostapd/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..82c2639
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/hostapd/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation
+
+All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
+room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
+fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
+The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
+buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
+termination. (CVE-2015-5315)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index 1f78544..75ceef1 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+       /*
+        * buffer and ACK the fragment
+        */
+-      if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++      if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
+               data->in_frag_pos += len;
+               if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
+                       wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack "
+@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+                       return NULL;
+               }
+               wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
+-
++      }
++      if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
+               resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD,
+                                    EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE,
+                                    EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData));
+@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+        * we're buffering and this is the last fragment
+        */
+       if (data->in_frag_pos) {
+-              wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
+               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
+                          (int) len);
+-              data->in_frag_pos += len;
+               pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
+               len = data->in_frag_pos;
+       }
+-- 
+1.9.1
+

diff --git a/package/hostapd/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch b/package/hostapd/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..bfc4c74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/hostapd/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation
+
+All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
+room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
+fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
+The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
+buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
+termination. (CVE-2015-5314)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+index cb83ff7..9f787ab 100644
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+       /*
+        * the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set
+        */
+-      if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++      if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
+               if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
+                       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow "
+                                  "attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)",
+@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+               }
+               wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
+               data->in_frag_pos += len;
++      }
++      if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment",
+                          (int) len);
+               return;
+@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+        * buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last)
+        */
+       if (data->in_frag_pos) {
+-              wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
+-              data->in_frag_pos += len;
+               pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
+               len = data->in_frag_pos;
+               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
+-- 
+1.9.1
+