+++ /dev/null
-From 1c6517973095a67c8cb57f3550fc1298404ab556 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:39:48 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Prevent possible DoS attempts during protocol handshake
-
-The limit for link message is specified using a 32 bit unsigned integer.
-This could cause possible DoS due to excessive memory allocations and
-some possible crashes.
-For instance a value >= 2^31 causes a spice_assert to be triggered in
-async_read_handler (reds-stream.c) due to an integer overflow at this
-line:
-
- int n = async->end - async->now;
-
-This could be easily triggered with a program like
-
- #!/usr/bin/env python
-
- import socket
- import time
- from struct import pack
-
- server = '127.0.0.1'
- port = 5900
-
- s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
- s.connect((server, port))
- data = pack('<4sIII', 'REDQ', 2, 2, 0xaaaaaaaa)
- s.send(data)
-
- time.sleep(1)
-
-without requiring any authentication (the same can be done
-with TLS).
-
-[Peter: fixes CVE-2016-9578]
-Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
-Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
----
- server/reds.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
-index f40b65c1..86a33d53 100644
---- a/server/reds.c
-+++ b/server/reds.c
-@@ -2202,7 +2202,8 @@ static void reds_handle_read_header_done(void *opaque)
-
- reds->peer_minor_version = header->minor_version;
-
-- if (header->size < sizeof(SpiceLinkMess)) {
-+ /* the check for 4096 is to avoid clients to cause arbitrary big memory allocations */
-+ if (header->size < sizeof(SpiceLinkMess) || header->size > 4096) {
- reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA);
- spice_warning("bad size %u", header->size);
- reds_link_free(link);
---
-2.11.0
-
+++ /dev/null
-From f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:40:10 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Prevent integer overflows in capability checks
-
-The limits for capabilities are specified using 32 bit unsigned integers.
-This could cause possible integer overflows causing buffer overflows.
-For instance the sum of num_common_caps and num_caps can be 0 avoiding
-additional checks.
-As the link message is now capped to 4096 and the capabilities are
-contained in the link message limit the capabilities to 1024
-(capabilities are expressed in number of uint32_t items).
-
-[Peter: fixes CVE-2016-9578]
-Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
-Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
----
- server/reds.c | 8 ++++++++
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
-index 86a33d53..91504544 100644
---- a/server/reds.c
-+++ b/server/reds.c
-@@ -2110,6 +2110,14 @@ static void reds_handle_read_link_done(void *opaque)
- link_mess->num_channel_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_channel_caps);
- link_mess->num_common_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_common_caps);
-
-+ /* Prevent DoS. Currently we defined only 13 capabilities,
-+ * I expect 1024 to be valid for quite a lot time */
-+ if (link_mess->num_channel_caps > 1024 || link_mess->num_common_caps > 1024) {
-+ reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA);
-+ reds_link_free(link);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
- num_caps = link_mess->num_common_caps + link_mess->num_channel_caps;
- caps = (uint32_t *)((uint8_t *)link_mess + link_mess->caps_offset);
-
---
-2.11.0
-
+++ /dev/null
-From 5f96b596353d73bdf4bb3cd2de61e48a7fd5b4c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2016 16:46:56 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] main-channel: Prevent overflow reading messages from client
-
-Caller is supposed the function return a buffer able to store
-size bytes.
-
-[Peter: fixes CVE-2016-9577]
-Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
-Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
----
- server/main_channel.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/server/main_channel.c b/server/main_channel.c
-index 0ecc9df8..1fc39155 100644
---- a/server/main_channel.c
-+++ b/server/main_channel.c
-@@ -1026,6 +1026,9 @@ static uint8_t *main_channel_alloc_msg_rcv_buf(RedChannelClient *rcc,
-
- if (type == SPICE_MSGC_MAIN_AGENT_DATA) {
- return reds_get_agent_data_buffer(mcc, size);
-+ } else if (size > sizeof(main_chan->recv_buf)) {
-+ /* message too large, caller will log a message and close the connection */
-+ return NULL;
- } else {
- return main_chan->recv_buf;
- }
---
-2.11.0
-
+++ /dev/null
-From f1e7ec03e26ab6b8ca9b7ec060846a5b706a963d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] reds: Disconnect when receiving overly big
- ClientMonitorsConfig
-
-Total message size received from the client was unlimited. There is
-a 2kiB size check on individual agent messages, but the MonitorsConfig
-message can be split in multiple chunks, and the size of the
-non-chunked MonitorsConfig message was never checked. This could easily
-lead to memory exhaustion on the host.
-
-Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
----
- server/reds.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
-index f439a366..7be85fdf 100644
---- a/server/reds.c
-+++ b/server/reds.c
-@@ -993,19 +993,34 @@ static void reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(void)
- static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
- MainChannelClient *mcc, void *message, size_t size)
- {
-+ const unsigned int MAX_MONITORS = 256;
-+ const unsigned int MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE =
-+ sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig) + MAX_MONITORS * sizeof(VDAgentMonConfig);
-+
- VDAgentMessage *msg_header;
- VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config;
- RedsClientMonitorsConfig *cmc = &reds->client_monitors_config;
-
-+ // limit size of message sent by the client as this can cause a DoS through
-+ // memory exhaustion, or potentially some integer overflows
-+ if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) + MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE - cmc->buffer_size < size) {
-+ goto overflow;
-+ }
- cmc->buffer_size += size;
- cmc->buffer = realloc(cmc->buffer, cmc->buffer_size);
- spice_assert(cmc->buffer);
- cmc->mcc = mcc;
- memcpy(cmc->buffer + cmc->buffer_pos, message, size);
- cmc->buffer_pos += size;
-+ if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) > cmc->buffer_size) {
-+ spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size);
-+ return;
-+ }
- msg_header = (VDAgentMessage *)cmc->buffer;
-- if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) > cmc->buffer_size ||
-- msg_header->size > cmc->buffer_size - sizeof(VDAgentMessage)) {
-+ if (msg_header->size > MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE) {
-+ goto overflow;
-+ }
-+ if (msg_header->size > cmc->buffer_size - sizeof(VDAgentMessage)) {
- spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size);
- return;
- }
-@@ -1013,6 +1028,12 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
- spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors);
- red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config);
- reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup();
-+ return;
-+
-+overflow:
-+ spice_warning("received invalid MonitorsConfig request from client, disconnecting");
-+ red_channel_client_disconnect(main_channel_client_get_base(mcc));
-+ reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup();
- }
-
- void reds_on_main_agent_data(MainChannelClient *mcc, void *message, size_t size)
---
-2.11.0
-
+++ /dev/null
-From ec6229c79abe05d731953df5f7e9a05ec9f6df79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] reds: Avoid integer overflows handling monitor
- configuration
-
-Avoid VDAgentMessage::size integer overflows.
-
-Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
----
- server/reds.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
-index 7be85fdf..e1c8c108 100644
---- a/server/reds.c
-+++ b/server/reds.c
-@@ -1024,6 +1024,9 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
- spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size);
- return;
- }
-+ if (msg_header->size < sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig)) {
-+ goto overflow;
-+ }
- monitors_config = (VDAgentMonitorsConfig *)(cmc->buffer + sizeof(*msg_header));
- spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors);
- red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config);
---
-2.11.0
-
+++ /dev/null
-From a957a90baf2c62d31f3547e56bba7d0e812d2331 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] reds: Avoid buffer overflows handling monitor
- configuration
-
-It was also possible for a malicious client to set
-VDAgentMonitorsConfig::num_of_monitors to a number larger
-than the actual size of VDAgentMOnitorsConfig::monitors.
-This would lead to buffer overflows, which could allow the guest to
-read part of the host memory. This might cause write overflows in the
-host as well, but controlling the content of such buffers seems
-complicated.
-
-Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
----
- server/reds.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
-index e1c8c108..3a42c375 100644
---- a/server/reds.c
-+++ b/server/reds.c
-@@ -1000,6 +1000,7 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
- VDAgentMessage *msg_header;
- VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config;
- RedsClientMonitorsConfig *cmc = &reds->client_monitors_config;
-+ uint32_t max_monitors;
-
- // limit size of message sent by the client as this can cause a DoS through
- // memory exhaustion, or potentially some integer overflows
-@@ -1028,6 +1029,12 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
- goto overflow;
- }
- monitors_config = (VDAgentMonitorsConfig *)(cmc->buffer + sizeof(*msg_header));
-+ // limit the monitor number to avoid buffer overflows
-+ max_monitors = (msg_header->size - sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig)) /
-+ sizeof(VDAgentMonConfig);
-+ if (monitors_config->num_of_monitors > max_monitors) {
-+ goto overflow;
-+ }
- spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors);
- red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config);
- reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup();
---
-2.11.0
-
# Locally calculated
-sha256 f901a5c5873d61acac84642f9eea5c4d6386fc3e525c2b68792322794e1c407d spice-0.12.8.tar.bz2
+sha256 1ead5de63d06eededed4017db37240f07bef0abffbaf621899647e7e685a1519 spice-0.14.1.tar.bz2
#
################################################################################
-SPICE_VERSION = 0.12.8
+SPICE_VERSION = 0.14.1
SPICE_SOURCE = spice-$(SPICE_VERSION).tar.bz2
-SPICE_SITE = http://www.spice-space.org/download/releases
+SPICE_SITE = http://www.spice-space.org/download/releases/spice-server
SPICE_LICENSE = LGPL-2.1+
SPICE_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING
SPICE_INSTALL_STAGING = YES
SPICE_DEPENDENCIES = \
+ host-pkgconf \
jpeg \
libglib2 \
openssl \
# We disable everything for now, because the dependency tree can become
# quite deep if we try to enable some features, and I have not tested that.
SPICE_CONF_OPTS = \
+ --disable-gstreamer \
--disable-opengl \
--disable-smartcard \
- --disable-automated-tests \
--without-sasl \
--disable-manual
SPICE_CONF_OPTS += --disable-lz4
endif
+ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_OPUS),y)
+SPICE_CONF_OPTS += --enable-opus
+SPICE_DEPENDENCIES += opus
+else
+SPICE_CONF_OPTS += --disable-opus
+endif
+
# no enable/disable, detected using pkg-config
ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_OPUS),y)
SPICE_DEPENDENCIES += opus
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