From: Gustavo Zacarias Date: Wed, 11 May 2016 17:55:43 +0000 (-0300) Subject: libarchive: add security patch for CVE-2016-1541 X-Git-Url: https://git.libre-soc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=156633ace8195997c374f901f5e61772f31b1ddc;p=buildroot.git libarchive: add security patch for CVE-2016-1541 Fixes: CVE-2016-1541 - heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the zip_read_mac_metadata function in libarchive, a multi-format archive and compression library, which may lead to the execution of arbitrary code if a user or automated system is tricked into processing a specially crafted ZIP file. Signed-off-by: Gustavo Zacarias Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard --- diff --git a/package/libarchive/0001-fix-CVE-2016-1541.patch b/package/libarchive/0001-fix-CVE-2016-1541.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ef2448c04b --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libarchive/0001-fix-CVE-2016-1541.patch @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From d0331e8e5b05b475f20b1f3101fe1ad772d7e7e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tim Kientzle +Date: Sun, 24 Apr 2016 17:13:45 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] Issue #656: Fix CVE-2016-1541, VU#862384 + +When reading OS X metadata entries in Zip archives that were stored +without compression, libarchive would use the uncompressed entry size +to allocate a buffer but would use the compressed entry size to limit +the amount of data copied into that buffer. Since the compressed +and uncompressed sizes are provided by data in the archive itself, +an attacker could manipulate these values to write data beyond +the end of the allocated buffer. + +This fix provides three new checks to guard against such +manipulation and to make libarchive generally more robust when +handling this type of entry: + 1. If an OS X metadata entry is stored without compression, + abort the entire archive if the compressed and uncompressed + data sizes do not match. + 2. When sanity-checking the size of an OS X metadata entry, + abort this entry if either the compressed or uncompressed + size is larger than 4MB. + 3. When copying data into the allocated buffer, check the copy + size against both the compressed entry size and uncompressed + entry size. + +Signed-off-by: Gustavo Zacarias +--- +Status: from upstream https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/issues/656 + + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_zip.c | 13 +++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_zip.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_zip.c +index 0f8262c..0a0be96 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_zip.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_zip.c +@@ -2778,6 +2778,11 @@ zip_read_mac_metadata(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry, + + switch(rsrc->compression) { + case 0: /* No compression. */ ++ if (rsrc->uncompressed_size != rsrc->compressed_size) { ++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, ++ "Malformed OS X metadata entry: inconsistent size"); ++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ } + #ifdef HAVE_ZLIB_H + case 8: /* Deflate compression. */ + #endif +@@ -2798,6 +2803,12 @@ zip_read_mac_metadata(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry, + (intmax_t)rsrc->uncompressed_size); + return (ARCHIVE_WARN); + } ++ if (rsrc->compressed_size > (4 * 1024 * 1024)) { ++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, ++ "Mac metadata is too large: %jd > 4M bytes", ++ (intmax_t)rsrc->compressed_size); ++ return (ARCHIVE_WARN); ++ } + + metadata = malloc((size_t)rsrc->uncompressed_size); + if (metadata == NULL) { +@@ -2836,6 +2847,8 @@ zip_read_mac_metadata(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry, + bytes_avail = remaining_bytes; + switch(rsrc->compression) { + case 0: /* No compression. */ ++ if ((size_t)bytes_avail > metadata_bytes) ++ bytes_avail = metadata_bytes; + memcpy(mp, p, bytes_avail); + bytes_used = (size_t)bytes_avail; + metadata_bytes -= bytes_used;