From: Baruch Siach Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2015 07:24:56 +0000 (+0300) Subject: hostapd: bump to version 2.5 X-Git-Url: https://git.libre-soc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=1639a7ebfa99f5b52dc7d2d8db94d826f4bac35f;p=buildroot.git hostapd: bump to version 2.5 Remove upstream patches. Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard --- diff --git a/package/hostapd/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch b/package/hostapd/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d9dccf9116..0000000000 --- a/package/hostapd/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,50 +0,0 @@ -From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser - -strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and -resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could -result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length -argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault. - -This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that -has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This -would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with -upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER -(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used). - -Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to -rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be -larger than the maximum configured body length. - -Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and -reporting this issue. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen -Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach ---- - src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++ - 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c -index 2f08f37275c0..d2855e32fd0f 100644 ---- a/src/wps/httpread.c -+++ b/src/wps/httpread.c -@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) - if (!isxdigit(*cbp)) - goto bad; - h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16); -+ if (h->chunk_size < 0 || -+ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d", -+ h->chunk_size); -+ goto bad; -+ } - /* throw away chunk header - * so we have only real data - */ --- -2.1.4 - diff --git a/package/hostapd/0002-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch b/package/hostapd/0002-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 307297b9e3..0000000000 --- a/package/hostapd/0002-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,42 +0,0 @@ -From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser - -The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the -length of the information elements (int left) could end up being -negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack -buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing -so, resulting in segmentation fault. - -This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service -attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses -hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based -drivers). - -Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and -reporting this issue. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen -Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach ---- - src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++ - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c -index 6d4177c2a847..314e244bc956 100644 ---- a/src/ap/wmm.c -+++ b/src/ap/wmm.c -@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd, - return; - } - -+ if (left < 0) -+ return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */ -+ - /* extract the tspec info element */ - if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) { - hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, --- -2.1.4 - diff --git a/package/hostapd/0003-EAP-pwd-fixes.patch b/package/hostapd/0003-EAP-pwd-fixes.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 16a1f53988..0000000000 --- a/package/hostapd/0003-EAP-pwd-fixes.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,154 +0,0 @@ -This patch combines the following upstream security fixes: - -28a069a545b0 EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior -3035cc2894e0 EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly -477c74395acd EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly -e28a58be2618 EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm -dd2f043c9c43 EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm - -Details at -http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/eap-pwd-missing-payload-length-validation.txt - -Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach ---- -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -index f2b092669a42..e58b13a42f73 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, - BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; - u16 offset; - u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL; -+ size_t prime_len, order_len; -+ -+ if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) { -+ ret->ignore = TRUE; -+ goto fin; -+ } -+ -+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime); -+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order); -+ -+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, -+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)", -+ (unsigned int) payload_len, -+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len)); -+ goto fin; -+ } - - if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) || - ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) || -@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, - u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr; - int offset; - -+ if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) { -+ ret->ignore = TRUE; -+ goto fin; -+ } -+ -+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, -+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)", -+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN); -+ goto fin; -+ } -+ - /* - * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function | - * prf -@@ -837,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, - * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field - */ - if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) { -+ if (len < 2) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field"); -+ ret->ignore = TRUE; -+ return NULL; -+ } - tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos); - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose " - "total length = %d", tot_len); - if (tot_len > 15000) - return NULL; -+ if (data->inbuf) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use"); -+ ret->ignore = TRUE; -+ return NULL; -+ } - data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len); - if (data->inbuf == NULL) { - wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer " -@@ -927,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, - /* - * we have output! Do we need to fragment it? - */ -+ lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch); - len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf); - if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) { - resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu, -diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -index 66bd5d2e9179..2bfc3c27647d 100644 ---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, - BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; - EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL; - int res = 0; -+ size_t prime_len, order_len; - - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response"); - -+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime); -+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order); -+ -+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, -+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)", -+ (unsigned int) payload_len, -+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len)); -+ goto fin; -+ } -+ - if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) || - ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) || - ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) || -@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, - u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr; - int offset; - -+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, -+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)", -+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN); -+ goto fin; -+ } -+ - /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */ - grp = htons(data->group_num); - ptr = (u8 *) &cs; -@@ -923,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, - * the first fragment has a total length - */ - if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) { -+ if (len < 2) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field"); -+ return; -+ } - tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos); - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total " - "length = %d", tot_len); - if (tot_len > 15000) - return; -+ if (data->inbuf) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use"); -+ return; -+ } - data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len); - if (data->inbuf == NULL) { - wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to " diff --git a/package/hostapd/hostapd.hash b/package/hostapd/hostapd.hash index 3c7b63ded4..869849b640 100644 --- a/package/hostapd/hostapd.hash +++ b/package/hostapd/hostapd.hash @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ # Locally calculated -sha256 6fe0eb6bd1c9cbd24952ece8586b6f7bd14ab358edfda99794e79b9b9dbd657f hostapd-2.4.tar.gz +sha256 8e272d954dc0d7026c264b79b15389ec2b2c555b32970de39f506b9f463ec74a hostapd-2.5.tar.gz diff --git a/package/hostapd/hostapd.mk b/package/hostapd/hostapd.mk index 1ad32a2465..e22e53f819 100644 --- a/package/hostapd/hostapd.mk +++ b/package/hostapd/hostapd.mk @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # ################################################################################ -HOSTAPD_VERSION = 2.4 +HOSTAPD_VERSION = 2.5 HOSTAPD_SITE = http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases HOSTAPD_SUBDIR = hostapd HOSTAPD_CONFIG = $(HOSTAPD_DIR)/$(HOSTAPD_SUBDIR)/.config