From: Baruch Siach Date: Mon, 4 May 2015 18:04:40 +0000 (+0300) Subject: wpa_supplicant: apply upstream security patches X-Git-Url: https://git.libre-soc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=39a4a79d8aad8e5bf754f360efd15442894dcaf1;p=buildroot.git wpa_supplicant: apply upstream security patches This commit adds patches for three different upstream security advisories. No CVE numbers stated. http://w1.fi/security/2015-2/wps-upnp-http-chunked-transfer-encoding.txt http://w1.fi/security/2015-3/integer-underflow-in-ap-mode-wmm-action-frame.txt http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/eap-pwd-missing-payload-length-validation.txt Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard --- diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d9dccf9116 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser + +strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and +resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could +result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length +argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault. + +This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that +has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This +would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with +upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER +(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used). + +Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to +rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be +larger than the maximum configured body length. + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach +--- + src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c +index 2f08f37275c0..d2855e32fd0f 100644 +--- a/src/wps/httpread.c ++++ b/src/wps/httpread.c +@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + if (!isxdigit(*cbp)) + goto bad; + h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16); ++ if (h->chunk_size < 0 || ++ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d", ++ h->chunk_size); ++ goto bad; ++ } + /* throw away chunk header + * so we have only real data + */ +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0003-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0003-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..307297b9e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/0003-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser + +The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the +length of the information elements (int left) could end up being +negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack +buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing +so, resulting in segmentation fault. + +This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service +attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses +hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based +drivers). + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach +--- + src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c +index 6d4177c2a847..314e244bc956 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wmm.c ++++ b/src/ap/wmm.c +@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + return; + } + ++ if (left < 0) ++ return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */ ++ + /* extract the tspec info element */ + if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) { + hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-fixes.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-fixes.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..16a1f53988 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-fixes.patch @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +This patch combines the following upstream security fixes: + +28a069a545b0 EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior +3035cc2894e0 EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly +477c74395acd EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly +e28a58be2618 EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm +dd2f043c9c43 EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm + +Details at +http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/eap-pwd-missing-payload-length-validation.txt + +Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach +--- +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +index f2b092669a42..e58b13a42f73 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; + u16 offset; + u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL; ++ size_t prime_len, order_len; ++ ++ if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) { ++ ret->ignore = TRUE; ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ ++ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime); ++ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order); ++ ++ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, ++ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len)); ++ goto fin; ++ } + + if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) || + ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) || +@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr; + int offset; + ++ if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) { ++ ret->ignore = TRUE; ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ ++ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN); ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ + /* + * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function | + * prf +@@ -837,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field + */ + if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) { ++ if (len < 2) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field"); ++ ret->ignore = TRUE; ++ return NULL; ++ } + tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose " + "total length = %d", tot_len); + if (tot_len > 15000) + return NULL; ++ if (data->inbuf) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use"); ++ ret->ignore = TRUE; ++ return NULL; ++ } + data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len); + if (data->inbuf == NULL) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer " +@@ -927,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + /* + * we have output! Do we need to fragment it? + */ ++ lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch); + len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf); + if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) { + resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu, +diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +index 66bd5d2e9179..2bfc3c27647d 100644 +--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; + EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL; + int res = 0; ++ size_t prime_len, order_len; + + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response"); + ++ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime); ++ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order); ++ ++ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, ++ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len)); ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ + if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) || + ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) || + ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) || +@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr; + int offset; + ++ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN); ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ + /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */ + grp = htons(data->group_num); + ptr = (u8 *) &cs; +@@ -923,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + * the first fragment has a total length + */ + if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) { ++ if (len < 2) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field"); ++ return; ++ } + tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total " + "length = %d", tot_len); + if (tot_len > 15000) + return; ++ if (data->inbuf) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use"); ++ return; ++ } + data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len); + if (data->inbuf == NULL) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "