From: Baruch Siach Date: Wed, 21 May 2014 09:54:00 +0000 (+0300) Subject: wpa_supplicant: fix internal TLS implementation security issues X-Git-Url: https://git.libre-soc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=39d1717efd390688da4b7a11af71ef63e09a3d42;p=buildroot.git wpa_supplicant: fix internal TLS implementation security issues Add upstream patches fixing internal TLS validation of X.509 certificates. See http://lists.shmoo.com/pipermail/hostap/2014-May/030273.html for details. Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard --- diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant-0002-X.509-Fix-internal-TLS-X.509-validation-of-PKCS-1-si.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant-0002-X.509-Fix-internal-TLS-X.509-validation-of-PKCS-1-si.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5a5b0c3845 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant-0002-X.509-Fix-internal-TLS-X.509-validation-of-PKCS-1-si.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From 9c29d48725fd40a82407a89f193cf009aeef9745 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 23:25:38 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] X.509: Fix internal TLS/X.509 validation of PKCS#1 + signature + +Verify that there is no extra data after the hash field. This is needed +to avoid potential attacks using additional data to construct a value +that passes the RSA operation and allows the hash value to be forged. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/tls/x509v3.c | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/tls/x509v3.c b/src/tls/x509v3.c +index a9483cb7fc2f..751a268e1caf 100644 +--- a/src/tls/x509v3.c ++++ b/src/tls/x509v3.c +@@ -1783,6 +1783,15 @@ skip_digest_oid: + return -1; + } + ++ if (hdr.payload + hdr.length < data + data_len) { ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_INFO, ++ "X509: Extra data after certificate signature hash", ++ hdr.payload + hdr.length, ++ data + data_len - hdr.payload - hdr.length); ++ os_free(data); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + os_free(data); + + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "X509: Certificate Digest matches with " +-- +2.0.0.rc2 + diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant-0003-PKCS-1-Allow-only-BT-01-for-signature-in-internal-TL.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant-0003-PKCS-1-Allow-only-BT-01-for-signature-in-internal-TL.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..57d752d0bb --- /dev/null +++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant-0003-PKCS-1-Allow-only-BT-01-for-signature-in-internal-TL.patch @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +From e6d83cc7babb978ba53ae8686159b41ab0f448cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 23:26:19 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] PKCS #1: Allow only BT=01 for signature in internal TLS + +Based on PKCS #1, v1.5, 10.1.3, the block type shall be 01 for a +signature. This avoids a potential attack vector for internal TLS/X.509 +implementation. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/tls/pkcs1.c | 29 ++++++++++------------------- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/tls/pkcs1.c b/src/tls/pkcs1.c +index b6fde5ee868a..af58a42987c6 100644 +--- a/src/tls/pkcs1.c ++++ b/src/tls/pkcs1.c +@@ -142,35 +142,26 @@ int pkcs1_decrypt_public_key(struct crypto_rsa_key *key, + * BT = 00 or 01 + * PS = k-3-||D|| times (00 if BT=00) or (FF if BT=01) + * k = length of modulus in octets ++ * ++ * Based on 10.1.3, "The block type shall be 01" for a signature. + */ + + if (len < 3 + 8 + 16 /* min hash len */ || +- plain[0] != 0x00 || (plain[1] != 0x00 && plain[1] != 0x01)) { ++ plain[0] != 0x00 || plain[1] != 0x01) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Invalid signature EB " + "structure"); + return -1; + } + + pos = plain + 3; +- if (plain[1] == 0x00) { +- /* BT = 00 */ +- if (plain[2] != 0x00) { +- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Invalid signature " +- "PS (BT=00)"); +- return -1; +- } +- while (pos + 1 < plain + len && *pos == 0x00 && pos[1] == 0x00) +- pos++; +- } else { +- /* BT = 01 */ +- if (plain[2] != 0xff) { +- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Invalid signature " +- "PS (BT=01)"); +- return -1; +- } +- while (pos < plain + len && *pos == 0xff) +- pos++; ++ /* BT = 01 */ ++ if (plain[2] != 0xff) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Invalid signature " ++ "PS (BT=01)"); ++ return -1; + } ++ while (pos < plain + len && *pos == 0xff) ++ pos++; + + if (pos - plain - 2 < 8) { + /* PKCS #1 v1.5, 8.1: At least eight octets long PS */ +-- +2.0.0.rc2 + diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant-0004-PKCS-1-Enforce-minimum-padding-for-decryption-in-int.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant-0004-PKCS-1-Enforce-minimum-padding-for-decryption-in-int.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7862de7a64 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant-0004-PKCS-1-Enforce-minimum-padding-for-decryption-in-int.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From 6c5be116dd6997f68e524247751cff53c74519d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 23:26:43 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] PKCS #1: Enforce minimum padding for decryption in + internal TLS + +Follow the PKCS #1 v1.5, 8.1 constraint of at least eight octets long PS +for the case where the internal TLS implementation decrypts PKCS #1 +formatted data. Similar limit was already in place for signature +validation, but not for this decryption routine. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/tls/pkcs1.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/tls/pkcs1.c b/src/tls/pkcs1.c +index af58a42987c6..ea3e6171a1d1 100644 +--- a/src/tls/pkcs1.c ++++ b/src/tls/pkcs1.c +@@ -113,6 +113,11 @@ int pkcs1_v15_private_key_decrypt(struct crypto_rsa_key *key, + pos++; + if (pos == end) + return -1; ++ if (pos - out - 2 < 8) { ++ /* PKCS #1 v1.5, 8.1: At least eight octets long PS */ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Too short padding"); ++ return -1; ++ } + pos++; + + *outlen -= pos - out; +-- +2.0.0.rc2 +