From: Peter Korsgaard Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2017 14:16:59 +0000 (+0200) Subject: libcroco: add upstream security fixes X-Git-Url: https://git.libre-soc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=52bfb4b1ce25d870f9bab72d285f326ec7d0ad77;p=buildroot.git libcroco: add upstream security fixes These have been added to upstream git after 0.6.12 was released. CVE-2017-7960 - The cr_input_new_from_uri function in cr-input.c in libcroco 0.6.11 and 0.6.12 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read) via a crafted CSS file. CVE-2017-7961 - The cr_tknzr_parse_rgb function in cr-tknzr.c in libcroco 0.6.11 and 0.6.12 has an "outside the range of representable values of type long" undefined behavior issue, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted CSS file. For more details, see: https://blogs.gentoo.org/ago/2017/04/17/libcroco-heap-overflow-and-undefined-behavior/ Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard --- diff --git a/package/libcroco/0001-input-check-end-of-input-before-reading-a-byte.patch b/package/libcroco/0001-input-check-end-of-input-before-reading-a-byte.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..831b1a7454 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libcroco/0001-input-check-end-of-input-before-reading-a-byte.patch @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +From 898e3a8c8c0314d2e6b106809a8e3e93cf9d4394 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro +Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2017 13:13:43 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] input: check end of input before reading a byte + +Fixes CVE-2017-7960 + +When reading bytes we weren't check that the index wasn't +out of bound and this could produce an invalid read which +could deal to a security bug. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard +--- + src/cr-input.c | 11 +++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/cr-input.c b/src/cr-input.c +index 49000b1..3b63a88 100644 +--- a/src/cr-input.c ++++ b/src/cr-input.c +@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ cr_input_new_from_uri (const gchar * a_file_uri, enum CREncoding a_enc) + *we should free buf here because it's own by CRInput. + *(see the last parameter of cr_input_new_from_buf(). + */ +- buf = NULL ; ++ buf = NULL; + } + + cleanup: +@@ -404,6 +404,8 @@ cr_input_get_nb_bytes_left (CRInput const * a_this) + enum CRStatus + cr_input_read_byte (CRInput * a_this, guchar * a_byte) + { ++ gulong nb_bytes_left = 0; ++ + g_return_val_if_fail (a_this && PRIVATE (a_this) + && a_byte, CR_BAD_PARAM_ERROR); + +@@ -413,6 +415,12 @@ cr_input_read_byte (CRInput * a_this, guchar * a_byte) + if (PRIVATE (a_this)->end_of_input == TRUE) + return CR_END_OF_INPUT_ERROR; + ++ nb_bytes_left = cr_input_get_nb_bytes_left (a_this); ++ ++ if (nb_bytes_left < 1) { ++ return CR_END_OF_INPUT_ERROR; ++ } ++ + *a_byte = PRIVATE (a_this)->in_buf[PRIVATE (a_this)->next_byte_index]; + + if (PRIVATE (a_this)->nb_bytes - +@@ -477,7 +485,6 @@ cr_input_read_char (CRInput * a_this, guint32 * a_char) + if (*a_char == '\n') { + PRIVATE (a_this)->end_of_line = TRUE; + } +- + } + + return status; +-- +2.11.0 + diff --git a/package/libcroco/0002-tknzr-support-only-max-long-rgb-values.patch b/package/libcroco/0002-tknzr-support-only-max-long-rgb-values.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1a9bcd947a --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libcroco/0002-tknzr-support-only-max-long-rgb-values.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 9ad72875e9f08e4c519ef63d44cdbd94aa9504f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro +Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2017 13:56:09 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] tknzr: support only max long rgb values + +Fixes CVE-2017-7961 + +This fixes a possible out of bound when reading rgbs which +are longer than the support MAXLONG + +Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard +--- + src/cr-tknzr.c | 10 ++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/cr-tknzr.c b/src/cr-tknzr.c +index 1a7cfeb..1548c35 100644 +--- a/src/cr-tknzr.c ++++ b/src/cr-tknzr.c +@@ -1279,6 +1279,11 @@ cr_tknzr_parse_rgb (CRTknzr * a_this, CRRgb ** a_rgb) + status = cr_tknzr_parse_num (a_this, &num); + ENSURE_PARSING_COND ((status == CR_OK) && (num != NULL)); + ++ if (num->val > G_MAXLONG) { ++ status = CR_PARSING_ERROR; ++ goto error; ++ } ++ + red = num->val; + cr_num_destroy (num); + num = NULL; +@@ -1298,6 +1303,11 @@ cr_tknzr_parse_rgb (CRTknzr * a_this, CRRgb ** a_rgb) + status = cr_tknzr_parse_num (a_this, &num); + ENSURE_PARSING_COND ((status == CR_OK) && (num != NULL)); + ++ if (num->val > G_MAXLONG) { ++ status = CR_PARSING_ERROR; ++ goto error; ++ } ++ + PEEK_BYTE (a_this, 1, &next_bytes[0]); + if (next_bytes[0] == '%') { + SKIP_CHARS (a_this, 1); +-- +2.11.0 +