From: Peter Korsgaard Date: Mon, 26 Apr 2021 21:55:53 +0000 (+0200) Subject: package/wpa_supplicant: add upstream patch to fix CVE-2021-30004 X-Git-Url: https://git.libre-soc.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=a8fbe67b9b16;p=buildroot.git package/wpa_supplicant: add upstream patch to fix CVE-2021-30004 Fixes the following security issue for the internal TLS backend: - CVE-2021-30004: In wpa_supplicant and hostapd 2.9, forging attacks may occur because AlgorithmIdentifier parameters are mishandled in tls/pkcs1.c and tls/x509v3.c. Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard --- diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-ASN.1-Validate-DigestAlgorithmIdentifier-parameters.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-ASN.1-Validate-DigestAlgorithmIdentifier-parameters.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5dcfed9406 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-ASN.1-Validate-DigestAlgorithmIdentifier-parameters.patch @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +From a0541334a6394f8237a4393b7372693cd7e96f15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 18:19:31 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] ASN.1: Validate DigestAlgorithmIdentifier parameters + +The supported hash algorithms do not use AlgorithmIdentifier parameters. +However, there are implementations that include NULL parameters in +addition to ones that omit the parameters. Previous implementation did +not check the parameters value at all which supported both these cases, +but did not reject any other unexpected information. + +Use strict validation of digest algorithm parameters and reject any +unexpected value when validating a signature. This is needed to prevent +potential forging attacks. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard +--- + src/tls/pkcs1.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ + src/tls/x509v3.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/tls/pkcs1.c b/src/tls/pkcs1.c +index bbdb0d72d..5761dfed0 100644 +--- a/src/tls/pkcs1.c ++++ b/src/tls/pkcs1.c +@@ -244,6 +244,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk, + os_free(decrypted); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestInfo", ++ hdr.payload, hdr.length); + + pos = hdr.payload; + end = pos + hdr.length; +@@ -265,6 +267,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk, + os_free(decrypted); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier", ++ hdr.payload, hdr.length); + da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length; + + if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) { +@@ -273,6 +277,23 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk, + os_free(decrypted); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: Digest algorithm parameters", ++ next, da_end - next); ++ ++ /* ++ * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to ++ * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these ++ * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else. ++ */ ++ if (da_end > next && ++ (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 || ++ !asn1_is_null(&hdr) || ++ hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "PKCS #1: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters"); ++ os_free(decrypted); ++ return -1; ++ } + + if (!asn1_oid_equal(&oid, hash_alg)) { + char txt[100], txt2[100]; +diff --git a/src/tls/x509v3.c b/src/tls/x509v3.c +index a8944dd2f..df337ec4d 100644 +--- a/src/tls/x509v3.c ++++ b/src/tls/x509v3.c +@@ -1964,6 +1964,7 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer, + os_free(data); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestInfo", hdr.payload, hdr.length); + + pos = hdr.payload; + end = pos + hdr.length; +@@ -1985,6 +1986,8 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer, + os_free(data); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier", ++ hdr.payload, hdr.length); + da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length; + + if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) { +@@ -1992,6 +1995,23 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer, + os_free(data); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: Digest algorithm parameters", ++ next, da_end - next); ++ ++ /* ++ * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to ++ * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these ++ * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else. ++ */ ++ if (da_end > next && ++ (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 || ++ !asn1_is_null(&hdr) || ++ hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "X509: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters"); ++ os_free(data); ++ return -1; ++ } + + if (x509_sha1_oid(&oid)) { + if (signature->oid.oid[6] != 5 /* sha-1WithRSAEncryption */) { +-- +2.20.1 + diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk index f59832645f..e9078b9f89 100644 --- a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk +++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ WPA_SUPPLICANT_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-16275 # 0001-P2P-Fix-a-corner-case-in-peer-addition-based-on-PD-R.patch WPA_SUPPLICANT_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2021-27803 +# 0002-ASN.1-Validate-DigestAlgorithmIdentifier-parameters.patch +WPA_SUPPLICANT_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2021-30004 + # install the wpa_client library WPA_SUPPLICANT_INSTALL_STAGING = YES @@ -132,8 +135,6 @@ ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBOPENSSL),y) WPA_SUPPLICANT_DEPENDENCIES += host-pkgconf libopenssl WPA_SUPPLICANT_LIBS += `$(PKG_CONFIG_HOST_BINARY) --libs openssl` WPA_SUPPLICANT_CONFIG_EDITS += 's/\#\(CONFIG_TLS=openssl\)/\1/' -# Issue only affects the "internal" TLS implementation -WPA_SUPPLICANT_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2021-30004 else WPA_SUPPLICANT_CONFIG_DISABLE += CONFIG_EAP_PWD CONFIG_EAP_TEAP WPA_SUPPLICANT_CONFIG_EDITS += 's/\#\(CONFIG_TLS=\).*/\1internal/'