From 17ba24bac10b4f09820259f442e4f7e1e59c1b2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas De Schampheleire Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 19:50:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] package/libarchive: add four security patches Add backported patches for the following four security issues in libarchive. There is no new release yet including these patches. - CVE-2018-1000877 (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000877) "libarchive version commit 416694915449219d505531b1096384f3237dd6cc onwards (release v3.1.0 onwards) contains a CWE-415: Double Free vulnerability in RAR decoder - libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c, parse_codes(), realloc(rar->lzss.window, new_size) with new_size = 0 that can result in Crash/DoS. This attack appear to be exploitable via the victim must open a specially crafted RAR archive." - CVE-2018-1000878 (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000878) "libarchive version commit 416694915449219d505531b1096384f3237dd6cc onwards (release v3.1.0 onwards) contains a CWE-416: Use After Free vulnerability in RAR decoder - libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c that can result in Crash/DoS - it is unknown if RCE is possible. This attack appear to be exploitable via the victim must open a specially crafted RAR archive." - CVE-2018-1000879 (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000879) "libarchive version commit 379867ecb330b3a952fb7bfa7bffb7bbd5547205 onwards (release v3.3.0 onwards) contains a CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference vulnerability in ACL parser - libarchive/archive_acl.c, archive_acl_from_text_l() that can result in Crash/DoS. This attack appear to be exploitable via the victim must open a specially crafted archive file." - CVE-2018-1000880 (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000880) "libarchive version commit 9693801580c0cf7c70e862d305270a16b52826a7 onwards (release v3.2.0 onwards) contains a CWE-20: Improper Input Validation vulnerability in WARC parser - libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c, _warc_read() that can result in DoS - quasi-infinite run time and disk usage from tiny file. This attack appear to be exploitable via the victim must open a specially crafted WARC file." Signed-off-by: Thomas De Schampheleire Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard --- ...ree-when-a-window-size-of-0-is-speci.patch | 40 +++++++++ ...cross-multi-part-archives-must-match.patch | 81 +++++++++++++++++++ .../0003-Skip-0-length-ACL-fields.patch | 52 ++++++++++++ .../0004-warc-consume-data-once-read.patch | 46 +++++++++++ 4 files changed, 219 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/libarchive/0001-Avoid-a-double-free-when-a-window-size-of-0-is-speci.patch create mode 100644 package/libarchive/0002-rar-file-split-across-multi-part-archives-must-match.patch create mode 100644 package/libarchive/0003-Skip-0-length-ACL-fields.patch create mode 100644 package/libarchive/0004-warc-consume-data-once-read.patch diff --git a/package/libarchive/0001-Avoid-a-double-free-when-a-window-size-of-0-is-speci.patch b/package/libarchive/0001-Avoid-a-double-free-when-a-window-size-of-0-is-speci.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..76096f7a45 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libarchive/0001-Avoid-a-double-free-when-a-window-size-of-0-is-speci.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +From 021efa522ad729ff0f5806c4ce53e4a6cc1daa31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 17:56:29 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid a double-free when a window size of 0 is specified + +new_size can be 0 with a malicious or corrupted RAR archive. + +realloc(area, 0) is equivalent to free(area), so the region would +be free()d here and the free()d again in the cleanup function. + +Found with a setup running AFL, afl-rb, and qsym. +--- + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +[for import into Buildroot] +Signed-off-by: Thomas De Schampheleire +Upstream-status: backport + +CVE-2018-1000877 + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +index 23452222..6f419c27 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +@@ -2300,6 +2300,11 @@ parse_codes(struct archive_read *a) + new_size = DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE; + else + new_size = rar_fls((unsigned int)rar->unp_size) << 1; ++ if (new_size == 0) { ++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, ++ "Zero window size is invalid."); ++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ } + new_window = realloc(rar->lzss.window, new_size); + if (new_window == NULL) { + archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, +-- +2.19.2 + diff --git a/package/libarchive/0002-rar-file-split-across-multi-part-archives-must-match.patch b/package/libarchive/0002-rar-file-split-across-multi-part-archives-must-match.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4bf68d61d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libarchive/0002-rar-file-split-across-multi-part-archives-must-match.patch @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +From bfcfe6f04ed20db2504db8a254d1f40a1d84eb28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 00:55:22 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] rar: file split across multi-part archives must match + +Fuzzing uncovered some UAF and memory overrun bugs where a file in a +single file archive reported that it was split across multiple +volumes. This was caused by ppmd7 operations calling +rar_br_fillup. This would invoke rar_read_ahead, which would in some +situations invoke archive_read_format_rar_read_header. That would +check the new file name against the old file name, and if they didn't +match up it would free the ppmd7 buffer and allocate a new +one. However, because the ppmd7 decoder wasn't actually done with the +buffer, it would continue to used the freed buffer. Both reads and +writes to the freed region can be observed. + +This is quite tricky to solve: once the buffer has been freed it is +too late, as the ppmd7 decoder functions almost universally assume +success - there's no way for ppmd_read to signal error, nor are there +good ways for functions like Range_Normalise to propagate them. So we +can't detect after the fact that we're in an invalid state - e.g. by +checking rar->cursor, we have to prevent ourselves from ever ending up +there. So, when we are in the dangerous part or rar_read_ahead that +assumes a valid split, we set a flag force read_header to either go +down the path for split files or bail. This means that the ppmd7 +decoder keeps a valid buffer and just runs out of data. + +Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb and qsym. +--- + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + +[for import into Buildroot] +Signed-off-by: Thomas De Schampheleire +Upstream-status: backport + +CVE-2018-1000878 + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +index 6f419c27..a8cc5c94 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ struct rar + struct data_block_offsets *dbo; + unsigned int cursor; + unsigned int nodes; ++ char filename_must_match; + + /* LZSS members */ + struct huffman_code maincode; +@@ -1560,6 +1561,12 @@ read_header(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry, + } + return ret; + } ++ else if (rar->filename_must_match) ++ { ++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, ++ "Mismatch of file parts split across multi-volume archive"); ++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ } + + rar->filename_save = (char*)realloc(rar->filename_save, + filename_size + 1); +@@ -2933,12 +2940,14 @@ rar_read_ahead(struct archive_read *a, size_t min, ssize_t *avail) + else if (*avail == 0 && rar->main_flags & MHD_VOLUME && + rar->file_flags & FHD_SPLIT_AFTER) + { ++ rar->filename_must_match = 1; + ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry); + if (ret == (ARCHIVE_EOF)) + { + rar->has_endarc_header = 1; + ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry); + } ++ rar->filename_must_match = 0; + if (ret != (ARCHIVE_OK)) + return NULL; + return rar_read_ahead(a, min, avail); +-- +2.19.2 + diff --git a/package/libarchive/0003-Skip-0-length-ACL-fields.patch b/package/libarchive/0003-Skip-0-length-ACL-fields.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..796bfbdeb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libarchive/0003-Skip-0-length-ACL-fields.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 15bf44fd2c1ad0e3fd87048b3fcc90c4dcff1175 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 14:29:42 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] Skip 0-length ACL fields + +Currently, it is possible to create an archive that crashes bsdtar +with a malformed ACL: + +Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. +archive_acl_from_text_l (acl=, text=0x7e2e92 "", want_type=, sc=) at libarchive/archive_acl.c:1726 +1726 switch (*s) { +(gdb) p n +$1 = 1 +(gdb) p field[n] +$2 = {start = 0x0, end = 0x0} + +Stop this by checking that the length is not zero before beginning +the switch statement. + +I am pretty sure this is the bug mentioned in the qsym paper [1], +and I was able to replicate it with a qsym + AFL + afl-rb setup. + +[1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/yun +--- + libarchive/archive_acl.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +[for import into Buildroot] +Signed-off-by: Thomas De Schampheleire +Upstream-status: backport + +CVE-2018-1000879 + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_acl.c b/libarchive/archive_acl.c +index 512beee1..7beeee86 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_acl.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_acl.c +@@ -1723,6 +1723,11 @@ archive_acl_from_text_l(struct archive_acl *acl, const char *text, + st = field[n].start + 1; + len = field[n].end - field[n].start; + ++ if (len == 0) { ++ ret = ARCHIVE_WARN; ++ continue; ++ } ++ + switch (*s) { + case 'u': + if (len == 1 || (len == 4 +-- +2.19.2 + diff --git a/package/libarchive/0004-warc-consume-data-once-read.patch b/package/libarchive/0004-warc-consume-data-once-read.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f07d6c08ca --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libarchive/0004-warc-consume-data-once-read.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 9c84b7426660c09c18cc349f6d70b5f8168b5680 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 16:33:42 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] warc: consume data once read + +The warc decoder only used read ahead, it wouldn't actually consume +data that had previously been printed. This means that if you specify +an invalid content length, it will just reprint the same data over +and over and over again until it hits the desired length. + +This means that a WARC resource with e.g. +Content-Length: 666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666665 +but only a few hundred bytes of data, causes a quasi-infinite loop. + +Consume data in subsequent calls to _warc_read. + +Found with an AFL + afl-rb + qsym setup. +--- + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +[for import into Buildroot] +Signed-off-by: Thomas De Schampheleire +Upstream-status: backport + +CVE-2018-1000880 + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c +index e8753853..e8fc8428 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c +@@ -386,6 +386,11 @@ _warc_read(struct archive_read *a, const void **buf, size_t *bsz, int64_t *off) + return (ARCHIVE_EOF); + } + ++ if (w->unconsumed) { ++ __archive_read_consume(a, w->unconsumed); ++ w->unconsumed = 0U; ++ } ++ + rab = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1U, &nrd); + if (nrd < 0) { + *bsz = 0U; +-- +2.19.2 + -- 2.30.2