From 306f630e676eb901789dd09a0f30d7e7fa941ebe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alan Coopersmith Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2013 16:33:03 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] integer overflow in XF86DRIGetClientDriverName() [CVE-2013-1993 2/2] clientDriverNameLength is a CARD32 and needs to be bounds checked before adding one to it to come up with the total size to allocate, to avoid integer overflow leading to underallocation and writing data from the network past the end of the allocated buffer. NOTE: This is a candidate for stable release branches. Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Brian Paul --- src/glx/XF86dri.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/glx/XF86dri.c b/src/glx/XF86dri.c index 8f53bd71953..56e35570601 100644 --- a/src/glx/XF86dri.c +++ b/src/glx/XF86dri.c @@ -305,9 +305,11 @@ XF86DRIGetClientDriverName(Display * dpy, int screen, *ddxDriverPatchVersion = rep.ddxDriverPatchVersion; if (rep.length) { - if (! - (*clientDriverName = - calloc(rep.clientDriverNameLength + 1, 1))) { + if (rep.clientDriverNameLength < INT_MAX) + *clientDriverName = calloc(rep.clientDriverNameLength + 1, 1); + else + *clientDriverName = NULL; + if (*clientDriverName == NULL) { _XEatData(dpy, ((rep.clientDriverNameLength + 3) & ~3)); UnlockDisplay(dpy); SyncHandle(); -- 2.30.2