From 440c7a9d9e260425a4bcdcd487e24d59843ac697 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carlos Santos Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2019 22:15:55 -0300 Subject: [PATCH] package/libseccomp: circumvent uClibc-ng bug on x86_64 On uClibc up to at least v1.0.32, syscall() for x86_64 is defined in libc/sysdeps/linux/x86_64/syscall.S as syscall: movq %rdi, %rax /* Syscall number -> rax. */ movq %rsi, %rdi /* shift arg1 - arg5. */ movq %rdx, %rsi movq %rcx, %rdx movq %r8, %r10 movq %r9, %r8 movq 8(%rsp),%r9 /* arg6 is on the stack. */ syscall /* Do the system call. */ cmpq $-4095, %rax /* Check %rax for error. */ jae __syscall_error /* Branch forward if it failed. */ ret /* Return to caller. */ And __syscall_error is defined in libc/sysdeps/linux/x86_64/__syscall_error.c as int __syscall_error(void) attribute_hidden; int __syscall_error(void) { register int err_no __asm__ ("%rcx"); __asm__ ("mov %rax, %rcx\n\t" "neg %rcx"); __set_errno(err_no); return -1; } Notice that __syscall_error returns -1 as a 32-bit int in %rax, a 64-bit register i.e. 0x00000000ffffffff (decimal 4294967295). When this value is compared to -1 in _sys_chk_seccomp_flag_kernel() the result is false, leading the function to always return 0. Prevent the error by coercing the return value of syscall() to int in a temporary variable before comparing it to -1. We could use just an (int) cast but the variable makes the code more readable and the machine code generated by the compiler is the same in both cases. All other syscall() invocations were inspected and they either already coerce the result to int or do not compare it to -1. The same problem probably occurs on other 64-bit systems but so far only x86_64 was tested. A bug report is being submitted to uClibc. Upstream status: https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/pull/175 Signed-off-by: Carlos Santos Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) --- ...n-uClibc-ng-syscall-on-x86_64-system.patch | 80 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/libseccomp/0002-Circumvent-bug-in-uClibc-ng-syscall-on-x86_64-system.patch diff --git a/package/libseccomp/0002-Circumvent-bug-in-uClibc-ng-syscall-on-x86_64-system.patch b/package/libseccomp/0002-Circumvent-bug-in-uClibc-ng-syscall-on-x86_64-system.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6ac9b08a76 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libseccomp/0002-Circumvent-bug-in-uClibc-ng-syscall-on-x86_64-system.patch @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +From 613e601bb4b50dc359b41f162a5b629449e4bbea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Carlos Santos +Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2019 22:02:49 -0300 +Subject: [PATCH] Circumvent bug in uClibc-ng syscall() on x86_64 systems + +On uClibc at least up to v1.0.32, syscall() for x86_64 is defined in +libc/sysdeps/linux/x86_64/syscall.S as + +syscall: + movq %rdi, %rax /* Syscall number -> rax. */ + movq %rsi, %rdi /* shift arg1 - arg5. */ + movq %rdx, %rsi + movq %rcx, %rdx + movq %r8, %r10 + movq %r9, %r8 + movq 8(%rsp),%r9 /* arg6 is on the stack. */ + syscall /* Do the system call. */ + cmpq $-4095, %rax /* Check %rax for error. */ + jae __syscall_error /* Branch forward if it failed. */ + ret /* Return to caller. */ + +And __syscall_error is defined in +libc/sysdeps/linux/x86_64/__syscall_error.c as + +int __syscall_error(void) attribute_hidden; +int __syscall_error(void) +{ + register int err_no __asm__ ("%rcx"); + __asm__ ("mov %rax, %rcx\n\t" + "neg %rcx"); + __set_errno(err_no); + return -1; +} + +Notice that __syscall_error returns -1 as a 32-bit int in %rax, a 64-bit +register i.e. 0x00000000ffffffff (decimal 4294967295). When this value +is compared to -1 in _sys_chk_seccomp_flag_kernel() the result is false, +leading the function to always return 0. + +Prevent the error by coercing the return value of syscall() to int in a +temporary variable before comparing it to -1. We could use just an (int) +cast but the variable makes the code more readable and the machine code +generated by the compiler is the same in both cases. + +All other syscall() invocations were inspected and they either already +coerce the result to int or do not compare it to -1. + +The same problem probably occurs on other 64-bit systems but so far only +x86_64 was tested. + +A bug report is being submitted to uClibc. + +Signed-off-by: Carlos Santos +--- + src/system.c | 8 +++++--- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/system.c b/src/system.c +index 8e5aafc..811b401 100644 +--- a/src/system.c ++++ b/src/system.c +@@ -215,10 +215,12 @@ static int _sys_chk_seccomp_flag_kernel(int flag) + /* this is an invalid seccomp(2) call because the last argument + * is NULL, but depending on the errno value of EFAULT we can + * guess if the filter flag is supported or not */ +- if (sys_chk_seccomp_syscall() == 1 && +- syscall(_nr_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL) == -1 && +- errno == EFAULT) ++ int rc; ++ if (sys_chk_seccomp_syscall() == 1) { ++ rc = syscall(_nr_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL); ++ if (rc == -1 && errno == EFAULT) + return 1; ++ } + + return 0; + } +-- +2.18.1 + -- 2.30.2